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INTRODUCTION

The beginning of any mediation is obviously a good time to clarify
procedures and roles. But it also offers the mediator a special opportunity
to elicit a commitment from the negotiating parties which can prove quite
useful later on: a commitment to flexibility. This article examines some advantages of seeking this commitment from the parties at the outset of negotiations and contrasts the commitment to flexibility with the more traditional
one to negotiate in good faith.
II.

COmr

NTS IN GENERAL

Except in situations where the law mandates it, people generally come
to mediation because they believe they can benefit from it in some way.
Thus, the outset of mediation is a good time to exploit whatever positive
forces brought them there. Moreover, it seems a basic tenet of human psychology that matters treated at the beginning of a discussion generally assume
greater prominence and are more easily remembered than what comes later.
If a mutual commitment is obtained at the outset, the entire negotiation can
be anchored in a framework to which all parties have voluntarily agreed. A
joint commitment also sets a productive tone for the negotiation and may
even generate some forward momentum.
* Peter Contuzzi (B.S., 1967, Cornell University; J.D., 1973, Harvard Law
School) of Easthampton, Massachusetts, works as a mediator and arbitrator for the
American Arbitration Association and serves as a mediation master for the Superior
Court of Massachusetts. He is an adjunct professor (Dispute Resolution) on the
faculty of Western New England Law School. His private mediation practice covers
a broad range of dispute settlements and business negotiations.
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The term "commitment" is a strong one in our language and should
definitely be used to enhance the value of this simple technique-no one
wants to be seen as reneging on a commitment freely made.
After reviewing procedures with the parties, the mediator is well positioned to raise the subject of commitments.' The traditional commitment to
request is that the parties agree to negotiate with each other in good faith.
Even where prior negotiations have broken down, a mediator who asks for
a fresh start and a commitment to good faith negotiating can usually obtain
it. Although relatively easy to obtain, this commitment has at least two
serious drawbacks: 1) it can backfire, making problems that develop later
on even more difficult to resolve, and 2) it is not amenable to constructive
use by the mediator.
When problems develop, the parties will almost always have different
views of what is reasonable. If those problems are serious enough, one party
may accuse the other of violating its commitment and of negotiating in bad
faith. That will most likely elicit the same accusation from the other side.
How do you measure bad faith negotiating? It is a difficult charge to concretely support or deny. The negotiation gets side-tracked, with the parties
now arguing over bad faith and broken commitments. Result: a difficult
situation becomes even worse.
Moreover, it is hard for a mediator to put such a commitment to productive use. A charge of bad faith negotiating, even if only implied by the
mediator, is a serious and risky matter. How can s/he effectively call a party
to task when the standard is so elusive? Besides, the parties have made the
commitment to each other, not to the mediator. If the mediator suggests to
Smith (gently and privately) that he may not be negotiating in good faith,
Smith can easily say: "Jones is not honoring his good faith commitment to
me so why should I honor mine to him." Does the mediator now defend
Jones to Smith? In short, the commitment to negotiate in good faith is a
hard one to cash in.
III.

THm Co~mrrrN

To

FLxmnxry

I've found I can get much more mileage out of a commitment to flexibility from the parties, one which they make not to each other but to me.
It's not as easy to obtain. A common objection goes like this: "I don't think
I can give you such a commitment-there are certain things about which I
feel strongly, things about which I'm just not willing to be flexible." My
response is to clarify what I mean by flexibility. I encourage them to be firm
regarding major concerns, but flexible regarding positions.
1. I generally do this by announcing that I am committing myself to give
the parties my best efforts as a neutral mediator. I then ask for a commitment from
them in return, a commitment to flexibility.
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This objection, in fact, is a convenient lead-in to a brief discussion which
can underscore an important distinction at the outset of the negotiation, the
difference between concerns and positions. 2 This discussion prepares the way
for the exploration of each side's major concerns which will come later. If
the parties begin by clearly recognizing that the concerns of each can probably
be satisfied by a variety of positions and then give me a commitment to be
flexible regarding their positions, the negotiation is off to a good start. If
any party has come to the negotiation without the willingness or authority
to move from a previously stated position, the commitment request brings
that into the open at the outset. Much wasted time can be avoided by immediately addressing that situation.
Flexibility is what keeps a negotiation moving-rigidity is what can easily
bring it to a grinding halt. If the parties remain focused on developing
positions which will satisfy their main concerns, the negotiation can better
maintain momentum. Some negotiations will never produce an agreement
because no overlap is possible between the interests and positions of one
party and those of the other. But if such a "zone of possible agreements"
exists, a flexibility commitment offers an effective, practical means of moving
the parties within that zone. A mediator who asks for more flexibility rather
than for more concessions offers the parties a terminology which facilitates
movement in a face-saving way.
Flexibility lends itself more readily to measurement than does good faith,
making it easier to evaluate if the commitment is being honored. Let's assume
that a party has not moved on any aspect of its bargaining position for quite
some time. It is a relatively simple matter (especially in a caucus with that
party) to recall the commitment without risking the crisis that a suggestion
of bad faith bargaining might provoke. The mediator makes direct mention
of both the lack of movement and the flexibility commitment which that
party gave to him/her.
A denial of inflexibility can be evaluated by factual references to position
development during the negotiation. The mediator can encourage the party
to generate some new ideas, perhaps with the mediator's assistance, as a sign
of flexibility. The message communicated by referring to this commitment
is not the vague one to "negotiate in good faith" but rather something more
concrete and practical-"We've been stuck in one place too long; let's develop some options."
If both parties are being rigid, the mediator can remind them of their
commitment to flexibility in a joint meeting (and perhaps explore possibilities
for some joint brainstorming) or work on developing options with each
during separate caucuses. The flexibility commitment can best have its desired

2. See, e.g., R. FS-IR & W. URiy, Gzrrno
umrr Wrrot GrvNo IN, ch. 3 (1981).
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stimulus effect if it is employed under appropriate circumstances. Wise mediators will not squander the leverage this gives them but reserve it to break

serious stalemates.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of this simple technique is due ultimately to our concept
of commitment and our desire to be seen as acting in conformity with the
commitments we make. A commitment is a serious matter-it can strongly
influence human behavior. Flexibility implies movement, and movement is
the lifeblood of negotiation. In joining these concepts, the commitment to
flexibility offers the mediator a useful lever for re-engaging the forward gears
of a stalled negotiation.
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